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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Green challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress and its order
awarding restitution in Twin Falls Case No. CR42-18-1293, and the district court's order
revoking his probation in Twin Falls Case No. CR42-16-10427. In the former case, the Court
should vacate the restitution award and the judgment of conviction, reverse the order denying
Mr. Green's motion to suppress, and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
In the latter case, the Court should vacate the order revoking Mr. Green's probation and remand
the case to the district court for a new disposition hearing.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2017, Mr. Green pled guilty to felony possession of marijuana over three ounces in
Twin Falls Case No. CR42-16-10427 (the "marijuana case").

(R., pp.61-71).

The court

sentenced him to serve five years, with three of those years fixed, and placed him on probation.
(R., pp.103-09.) In 2018, the State charged Mr. Green with felony methamphetamine trafficking
in Twin Falls Case No. CR42-18-1293 (the "methamphetamine case"). (R., pp.173-74, 185-86.)
The State then moved to revoke Mr. Green's probation in the marijuana case, alleging that he
violated the terms of his probation by trafficking in methamphetamine, possessing
methamphetamine and paraphernalia, and allowing an absconding felon to hide in his home.
(R., pp.120-31.)
Mr. Green moved to suppress all of the statements he made in the methamphetamine
case, arguing that officers took his statements in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights by
failing to read him his Miranda rights and by placing him in a classic penalty situation.
(R., pp.197-204.) The court denied the motion. (R., pp.221-35.)

1

The State later filed an amended information which charged Mr. Green with a persistent
violator enhancement, and Mr. Green pied guilty to trafficking methamphetamine and the
persistent violator enhancement without the benefit of a plea agreement. (R., pp.247-60; 6/23/18
Tr., p.6, L.23-p.17, L.25.) He reserved his right to challenge the district court's denial of his
motion to suppress on appeal. (8/22/18 Tr., p.4, Ls.5-9; R., p.255.) Mr. Green also admitted to
the first two probation violation allegations in the marijuana case-that he had trafficked in
methamphetamine and had possessed methamphetamine and paraphernalia in his home-and the
State dismissed the third allegation. (9/11/2018, p.4, Ls.16-19, p.7, L.22-p.9, L.8.)
The court revoked Mr. Green's probation in the marijuana case and sentenced him to a
concurrent term of twelve years, with five of those years fixed, in the methamphetamine case.
(10/26/18 Tr., p.20, Ls.8-16, p.21, Ls.1-7; R., pp.150-51, 280-83.) It also awarded the full
amount of restitution requested by the State in the methamphetamine case. (R., pp.286-87.)
Mr. Green filed notice of appeal timely from his judgment of conviction and restitution
order in the methamphetamine case, and from the order revoking his probation in the marijuana
case. (R., pp.153-55, 291-93.) This Court consolidated both appeals. (R., p.304.)

2

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by awarding $1,951.78 in restitution because
that award was not supported by substantial evidence?

II.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Green's motion to suppress?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by revoking Mr. Green's probation?

3

ARGUMENT

L
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Awarding $1,951.78 In Restitution Because That
Award Was Not Supported By Substantial Evidence

A.

Factual Background
The prosecutor requested $1,951.78 in restitution m the methamphetamine case.

(10/26/18 Tr., p.10, Ls.24-p.11, L.3.) Although it appears the prosecutor did not file a motion
for restitution, that amount consists of $1,462.50 for the prosecutors' time at a rate of $75 an
hour (Aug., pp.1--4), $100 for the cost of testing the methamphetamine (PSI, p.164), and $389.28
for costs incurred by the Twin Falls Police Department (PSI, p.165). Defense counsel did not
object to the State's restitution request (10/26/18 Tr., p.11, Ls.13-15), and the court awarded
restitution in full (R., pp.286-87).

B.

Applicable Law
Idaho Code § 37-2732(k) provides that,
Upon conviction of a felony or misdemeanor violation under this chapter ... the
court may order restitution for costs incurred by law enforcement agencies in
investigating the violation. . . . Costs shall include, but not be limited to, those
incurred for the purchase of evidence, travel and per diem for law enforcement
officers and witnesses throughout the course of the investigation, hearings and
trials, and any other investigative or prosecution expenses actually incurred,
including regular salaries of employees ....

(Emphasis added). 1

"As guidance concerning the correct interpretation of section 37-2732(k),"

this Court has noted "that section 37-2732(k), by its plain terms, grants discretion to award

1

Similarly, LC. § 19-5304(2) provides that the court can award restitution for "any crime which
results in an economic loss to the victim," and LC.§ 19-5304(1)(a) defmes economic loss as "the
value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, lost wages, and direct out-ofpocket losses or expenses, such as medical expenses resulting from the criminal conduct .... "
4

restitution to the State for prosecution expenses 'actually incurred."' State v. Nelson, 161 Idaho
692, 697 (2017); State v. Cunningham, 161 Idaho 698, 702 (2017). 2 "At a minimum, measuring
up to section 37-2732(k)'s burden to prove expenses actually incurred will generally require

sworn statements that delineate the time spent performing specific tasks." Nelson, 161 Idaho at
697 (emphasis added). The restitution award must be supported by substantial and competent
evidence.

Id. at 695.

"[U]nswom representations, even by an officer of the court, do not

constitute 'substantial evidence' upon which restitution under section 37-2732(k) may be based."

Id. at 697.
This Court reviews restitution awards for an abuse of discretion.

Id. at 695.

The

appellate court evaluates whether the trial court "(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018). That requires
the district court to "base the amount of restitution upon the preponderance of evidence
submitted by the prosecutor, defendant, victim, or presentence investigator." Nelson, 161 Idaho
at 695 (quoting State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 170 (Ct. App. 2014)). "The district court's
factual findings with regard to restitution will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by
substantial evidence."

State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602 (2011) (citing State v.

Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 822 (Ct. App. 2010)). Substantial evidence is "relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." State v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916, 919
(2017) (quoting State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885 (2013)). A defendant need not object to a

2

Nelson and Cunningham were decided at the same time and are largely identical.
simplicity's sake, Mr. Green cites only to Nelson for the remainder of this brief.
5

For

restitution award on the grounds that it is unsupported by substantial evidence in order to raise
that issue on appeal. See State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873 (Ct. App. 2007) ("An appellate
challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to meet a party's burden of proof requires no specific
action or argument below."); State v. Ashley, 126 Idaho 694, 695-96 (Ct. App. 1994) (same). 3

C.

Analysis
The district court did not act consistently with the relevant legal standards and did not

exercise reason when awarding restitution because the State did not provide sworn evidence that
the restitution it requested was for expenses actually incurred in this case, and thus did not meet
its burden of providing substantial evidence to support the restitution award.

1.

Substantial Evidence Does Not Support The Restitution Awarded To The Twin
Falls Prosecuting Attorney's Office

The only evidence supporting the $1,462.50 in prosecution costs awarded to the Twin
Falls Prosecuting Attorney's Office is a "restitution request." (Aug., pp.1--4.) The restitution
request begins by stating that "Jill C. Sweesy, Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney ... submits
the following Time Sheet for Restitution Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 37-2732(k). The Twin
Falls Prosecuting Attorney's Office seeks restitution for attorney time in the above-entitled case
as follows, at a rate of $75. 00 per hour." (Aug., p.1 ( emphasis added).) It then lists various
tasks and the associated amounts of time spent, along with the total amount of time and the total
amount ofrestitution requested. (Aug., pp.1-3.) Finally, it provides: "I, Jill C. Sweesy, Senior

3

Mr. Green is unaware of a published decision holding as much with respect to a restitution
award in particular, but the Court of Appeals has endorsed this conclusion in unpublished
decisions. See State v. Ibarra, No. 44945, 2018 WL 4608801, at *4 (Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2018);
State v. Weindel, No. 45797, 2019 WL 2613287, at *1-2 (Idaho Ct. App. June 26, 2019).
6

Deputy Prosecuting A+ttorney [sic], for Twin Falls County hereby certify the above accurately
reflects the time spent on this case." (Aug., p.3 (emphasis added).)
The restitution request does not provide substantial evidence to show that the
reimbursement rate of $75.00 per hour of the prosecutor's time was the cost "actually incurred"
within the meaning of LC. § 37-2732(k). 4 First, the restitution request does not claim that $75 is
Ms. Sweesy's 5 hourly pay and wholly fails to identify her actual hourly rate.

(Aug., p.1.)

Indeed, if Ms. Sweesy were to actually earn $75 an hour, she would be making $156,000 per
year ($75 per hour x 40 hours per week x 52 weeks)-far more than Idaho's Attorney General.
See https://transparentdata.idaho.gov. Because a restitution award under LC. § 37-2732(k) must
reflect the actual cost of the prosecutor's time, not simply a "reasonable" fee, this part of the
restitution request is not supported by substantial evidence.

See Nelson, 161 Idaho at 697

(explaining that LC. § 37-2732(k) gives the district court discretion to award restitution for
prosecution expenses "actually incurred," and "does not permit recovery of what is
'reasonable."').
Second, the certification at the end of the restitution request only claims that "the above
accurately reflects the time spent on this case," but does not make any claim as to propriety or
veracity of the $75.00 rate. (Aug., p.3 (emphasis added).) Because LC. § 37-2732(k) requires
sworn evidence, the unsworn request for $75.00 per hour is not supported by substantial

4

The Twin Falls Prosecuting Attorney's Office may simply ask for reimbursement at a rate of
$75 per hour as a matter of routine. See Weaver, 158 Idaho at 169-71 & 170 n.1 (in which the
Court of Appeals upheld a restitution award to the Twin Fall's Prosecuting Attorney's Office at a
rate of $7 5 an hour where Weaver challenged only the amount of time the prosecutor reported
and not the hourly rate); see also Nelson, 161 Idaho at 696 (distinguishing Weaver on that basis).
5
In addition to these deficiencies, it is not clear whether the restitution request sought to recover
only the cost of Ms. Sweesy's time, or if it also sought to recover the cost of the time that other
attorneys may have spent on the case, as the restitution request merely asks for "restitution for
attorney time." (Aug., p.1.)
7

evidence. See Nelson, 161 Idaho at 697 ("[a]t a minimum, measuring up to section 37-2732(k)'s
burden to prove expenses actually incurred will generally require sworn statements . . .")
(emphasis added).

2.

Substantial Evidence Does Not Support The Restitution Awarded To The Twin
Falls Police Department

Although it does not appear the State submitted any documentation to support its request
for $389.28 in restitution to reimburse the Twin Falls Police Department ("TFPD"), a "billing
order" addressed to the Twin Falls County Prosecutor from ISP was included in the presentence
investigation report in the methamphetamine case. (PSI, p.165.) It lists the following expenses:

(Id.)

Patrol Division: 2 officers X 7.5 hrs

$287.25

Property/Evidence & Shipping
Support Service/Records
Other Charges: Administration
Total Charges

$30.00
$45.23
$26.80
$389.28

The billing order is unswom.

(Id.) It merely has a signature line for "SSGT Chuck

Gamer," but was not actually signed. (Id.)
The billing order does not provide substantial evidence to show that the requested
restitution was for expenses "actually incurred" pursuant to LC. § 37-2732(k). First, each of the
requested reimbursements are not sufficiently detailed to determine whether they were for
expenses actually incurred in this case, and thus are not supported by substantial evidence.
See Nelson, 161 Idaho at 697 ("At a minimum, measuring up to section 37-2732(k)'s burden to
prove expenses actually incurred will generally require sworn statements that delineate the time
spent performing specific tasks.") (emphasis added). The request for "Patrol Division: 2 officers
X 7.5 hrs $287.25," fails to state for which two officers' work the TFPD sought reimbursement,
when they worked on the case, what tasks they performed while working on the case, and what

8

their hourly rate was. (PSI, p.165.) The remaining costs are equally elusive, as the billing order
provides no indication what "Property/Evidence" was shipped, what "Support Services/Records"
were required, or what specific "Administration" charges were incurred, nor does it indicate
when those costs were incurred or by whom. (Id.)
Second, the billing order is not sworn, certified, or even signed, and thus is not
substantial evidence to support the award. See PSI, p.165; Nelson, 161 Idaho at 697 ("[a]t a
minimum, measuring up to section 37-2732(k)'s burden to prove expenses actually incurred will
generally require sworn statements ... ") (emphasis added).

3.

Substantial Evidence Does Not Support The Restitution Awarded To The Idaho
State Police

Like the request for the TFPD's purported costs, it does not appear the State filed any
documentation to support its request for $100 in restitution to reimburse the Idaho State Police
("ISP") for lab costs, though an "Idaho State Police Drug Restitution" form was included in the
presentence investigation report. 6 (PSI, p.164.) The drug restitution form provided that "the
Idaho State Police requests restitution from the defendant, ROBERT C GREEN in the amount of
$100 in association with Laboratory Case No. P2018-0428.

This amount is based upon the

testing of the sample(s) submitted to this laboratory. The amount requested reflects a portion of
the cost incurred to the laboratory during the analysis of drug evidence." (Id.) It then lists the
test performed and the cost, instructs the prosecutor to provide the drug restitution form and the
lab report to the court at sentencing, lists payment instructions, and thanks the prosecutor's office

6

In addition to the other deficiencies in the TFPD's billing order and the ISP's drug restitution
form, the fact that the State did not file a motion for restitution attaching both documents is in
itself problematic.
9

for their cooperation. (Id.) It was signed by Rachel Cutler, but is not sworn or certified to be
correct. (Id.)
Just like the TFPD's billing order, the ISP's drug restitution form does not provide
substantial evidence to show that the requested restitution was for expenses "actually incurred"
within the meaning of LC. § 37-2732(k) because it was not sworn. See PSI, p.164; Nelson,
161 Idaho at 697 (''unsworn representations . . . do not constitute "substantial evidence" upon
which restitution under section 37-2732(k) may be based").
In short, because the State did not provide sworn evidence that the restitution it requested
was for expenses actually incurred pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732(k), substantial evidence does not
support the restitution awarded by the district court. The district court thus abused its discretion
by awarding restitution.

II.
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Green's Motion To Suppress Because The Officer
Violated Mr. Green's Rights Under Miranda

A.

Factual Background
Mr. Green moved to suppress all of the statements he made in the methamphetamine

case, arguing that officers took his statements in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights by
failing to read him his Miranda rights and by placing him in a classic penalty situation.
(R., pp.197-204.) After a hearing at which Mr. Green's probation officer and a police officer
testified (6/21/18 Tr., p.6, L.5-p.45, L.23), and Mr. Green admitted his probation agreement
(Exs., pp.7-9 (De£ Ex. B to 6/21/18 Tr.)) and video from two officers' body cameras (Def. Ex.
A to 6/21/18 Tr.), the district court made the following factual findings:

10

1. At the time of the events relevant to Defendant’s motion to suppress,
Defendant was a probationer in Twin Falls County Case No. CR42-16-10427.
2. Defendant’s Probation Officer was Officer Jeremy Ajeti.
3. As a standard part of the conditions of Defendant’s probation, Defendant was
required to “cooperate with the requests of [his] probation/parole officer.
Cooperation includes being truthful.” Further, Defendant consented “to the
search of [his] person, residence, vehicle, personal property, and other real
property or structures owned or leased by [him], or for which [he] is the
controlling authority conducted by any agent of IDOC or a law enforcement
officer. [He] hereby waives [his] rights under the Fourth Amendment and the
Idaho constitution concerning searches.”
4. The IDOC Agreement of Supervision contains as one of its provisions that
Defendant acknowledge understanding of the terms of probation and provides
the warning that violation of the agreement “may result in the submission of a
report of violation to [Defendant’s] sentencing/paroling authority.” Defendant
signed, and was aware of, the terms of the IDOC Agreement of Supervision.
5. On January 29, 2018, slightly before 11:00 a.m., Officer Ajeti, conducted a
routine house check on Defendant at his residence. At the time of the house
check, Defendant resided in a downstairs basement apartment.
6. As Officer Ajeti crossed the threshold of Defendant’s apartment, Officer Ajeti
immediately detected the odor of marijuana and asked Defendant whether he
was in possession of controlled substances and whether there was anyone else
in the apartment. Defendant answered in the negative.
7. Ajeti then conducted a protective sweep of the apartment. In so doing, he
discovered Marisol Garza hiding in Defendant’s closet. Officer Ajeti
removed Ms. Garza from the closet, placed her in handcuffs, escorted her to
the living room area, and seated her on the couch.
8. Officer Ajeti ascertained that Garza was also an absconding probationer who
had an active arrest warrant issued by the Idaho Department of Corrections.
Officer Ajeti called for police backup to arrest Garza.
9. Officer Ajeti did not, however, place the Defendant in handcuffs and began to
question Defendant in his kitchen regarding the presence of illegal substances
in the apartment. Officer Ajeti did not threaten Defendant with a probation
violation. Nor did Officer Ajeti discuss the possibility of a probation violation
during his questioning of Defendant. Officer Ajeti made no threats to
Defendant.
10. At some point, Twin Falls Police Officer Caldwell arrived on-scene. At that
point, Officer Ajeti, placed handcuffs on Defendant and seated him on his
couch in the living room.
11

11. Officers Ajeti and Caldwell then began a search of Defendant’s residence. In
addition, Officer Caldwell began asking Defendant about controlled
substances on the premises. Defendant denied the presence of any drugs in
the apartment to Officer Caldwell.
12. Both Officers continued to search the apartment. At one point, Officer
Caldwell left the apartment, at which point Defendant voluntarily, and without
any question being posed to him, called Officer Ajeti over to him and
confessed to the presence of drugs in the apartment, saying “There’s shit
here.” He then informed Officer Ajeti that there were drugs in his closet, and
that the drugs were not his.
13. Officer Ajeti went to the closet in the bedroom and located a bong in the
closet. After a short amount of time had elapsed, Defendant called Officer
Ajeti back into the living room and informed Officer Ajeti that there was also
a safe in the bedroom, and provided Officer Ajeti with the combination to the
safe.
14. After Officer Ajeti confirmed that the safe held controlled substances, Officer
Caldwell placed Defendant under arrest and advised Defendant of his Miranda
rights.
15. Defendant then indicated that he wanted to work with law enforcement in
providing additional information regarding his acquisition of drugs. Officer
Caldwell called for an investigator to assist. After a short time, Investigator
Sweesy arrived at Defendant’s home to discuss future cooperation between
Defendant and law enforcement.
16. Defendant admitted to being part of a drug trade, in which he would store
methamphetamine for pick-up by a distributor who would pay him $1,000.00
weekly. Defendant admitted that about a pound or more of methamphetamine
per week flowed through his premises.
17. Defendant called a source to make a sale, but the individual he contacted
never made the effort to arrive at Defendant’s home.
(R., pp.225–27 (alterations in original).) Based on those findings, the court concluded that
Mr. Green was not in custody for purposes of Miranda when he made incriminating statements,
that he was not in a classic penalty situation because the officers never threatened to revoke his
probation and because such a penalty could not be inferred from his probation agreement, and
that he voluntarily confessed without prompting from the officers. (R., pp.228–33.) It thus
denied his motion. (R., pp.221–35.)
12

B.

Applicable Law
To protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, officers

must inform a defendant of his rights to remain silent and to counsel before beginning a custodial
interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966). "A person is in custody, for
Miranda purposes, from the moment of formal arrest or as soon as the person's 'freedom of

action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest."' State v. Silver, 155 Idaho 29, 31
(Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984)); see also Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212-13 (1979) (holding that handcuffing a defendant, taking him to a

police station, and putting him in an interrogation room is not merely a "detention" but is
equivalent to a formal arrest). "However, persons temporarily detained by law enforcement are
not in custody for purposes of Miranda." State v. Andersen, 164 Idaho 309, 313 (2018). To
determine whether the defendant is in custody, the Court applies an objective totality-of-thecircumstances test aimed at determining how a reasonable person in the defendant's position
would have understood his situation.

Relevant considerations include "where the

Id.

questioning occurred, the duration of the interrogation, whether the defendant is informed that
the detention may not be temporary, and the intensiveness of the questions and requests of the
police officer." Id. The defendant has the burden of proving that he was in custody. Id.
"In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, this Court will
defer to the trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous. However, free review is
exercised over a trial court's determination as to whether constitutional requirements have been
satisfied in light of the facts found."

State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 522 (2002); see also

Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 389 (2010) ("The state court's decision rejecting

Thompkins's Miranda claim was thus correct under de nova review.").

13

C.

Analysis
Mindful that Mr. Green was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he told the

officers about the methamphetamine and paraphernalia in his home, see Andersen, 164 Idaho at
313; R., pp.225-27, he nevertheless contends that the district court erred by denying his motion
to suppress. As argued below, after Mr. Green "was placed into handcuffs and told where to sit,
and prior to Miranda warnings, he was questioned about the location of drugs in the house and
about the combination to the safe in the adjoining room. His responses to this questioning
should clearly be suppressed." (R., p.198.) The district court thus erred by denying his motion
to suppress.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Green's Probation
Whether willfully violating a condition of probation justifies revoking a defendant's
probation "is a question addressed to the judge's sound discretion." State v. Adams, 115 Idaho
1053, 1054 (Ct. App. 1989). However, "a judge cannot revoke probation arbitrarily." Id. at
1055. It may revoke probation "if the judge reasonably concludes from the defendant's conduct
that probation is not achieving its rehabilitative purpose." Id.
The appellate court "defers to the trial court's decision" unless it abused its discretion.
Id. This Court must consider the entire record, including the defendant's conduct before and

during probation, State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 149, 153-54 (1986), and must take into
consideration the four goals of sentencing: the protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution, State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5-6 (2010).
Mindful that Mr. Green did not ask that the district court continue him on probation in the
marijuana case because his guilty plea in the methamphetamine case carried a three-year

14

mandatory minimum, 10/26/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.12-19, LC.§ 37-2732B(a)(4)(A), he asserts that, if
the Court grants his requested relief on the motion to suppress in the methamphetamine case, it
should also vacate the order revoking his probation in the marijuana case and remand for a new
disposition hearing.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Green respectfully requests that, as to the methamphetamine case, the Court vacate
the restitution order and judgment of conviction, reverse the order denying his motion to
suppress, and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. In the marijuana
case, the Court should vacate the order revoking Mr. Green's probation and remand the case to
the district court for a new disposition hearing.
DATED this 22 nd day of July, 2019.

/s/ Maya P. Waldron
MAYAP. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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